Anubis and Khazad are closely related involution block ciphers. Building on two recent AES software results, this work presents a number of constant-time software implementations of Anubis and Khazad for processors with a byte-vector shuffle instruction, such as those that support SSSE3. For Anubis, the first is serial in the sense that it employs only one cipher instance and is compatible with all standard block cipher modes. Efficiency is largely due to the S-box construction that is simple to realize using a byte shuffler. The equivalent for Khazad runs two parallel instances in counter mode. The second for each cipher is a parallel bit-slice implementation in counter mode.
Introduction
Anubis and Khazad are two block ciphers by Barreto and Rijmen submitted during the NESSIE project (see [12] for a summary). Anubis [2] works on 128-bit blocks and is quite similar in many respects to AES. Khazad [3] is a "legacylevel" cipher working on 64-bit blocks and is closely related to Anubis. These are both involution ciphers: decryption differs from encryption only in the key schedule.
The motivation for this work comes largely from cache-timing attacks, where an attacker attempts to recover parts of the cryptosystem state by observing the variance in timing measurements due to processor data caching effects. These attacks can be time-driven and carried out remotely by measuring the latency of a high level operation, or trace-driven and locally by exploiting the cache structure to determine the sequence of lookups the cryptosystem performs. The vulnerability exists when part of the state is used as an index into a memoryresident table.
A high-speed table-based implementation of AES unrolls lower level operations such as SubBytes, ShiftRows, and MixColumns into four tables of size 256 containing 32-bit values. Lookups into these tables, indexed by state values, are combined with XOR to carry out AES rounds in a more software-friendly manner, relaxing the need to manipulate a large number of single byte values and bits within those bytes. Similar versions of both Anubis and Khazad exist, in fact provided as the C reference implementations and discussed in both specifications [2,3, Sect. 7.1].
Cache-timing attacks are a serious threat and can easily lead to leakage of key material. Although there are numerous published attacks on such implementations, a practical noteworthy one is Bernstein's AES time-driven attack [5] . Anubis and Khazad are presumably susceptible to this and other timing attacks. In light of these attacks, a reasonable security requirement for any cipher is that it can be implemented to use a constant amount of time. In this context, Bernstein defines constant as "independent of the AES key and input" [5, Sect. 8]. The concept of security within this paper is with respect to timing attacks.
To this end, this work shows that constant-time and efficient implementations of both Anubis and Khazad are possible. Four such implementations appear herein, summarized as follows.
-The first Anubis implementation runs only one instance of the cipher, compatible with all standard block cipher modes. This is efficient due to a bytevector shuffle instruction, allowing elegant realization of the nonlinear layer in constant-time. The Khazad implementation is otherwise analogous but with a smaller state runs two parallel cipher instances, here in counter mode under the same key. -The second Anubis implementation bit-slices the state and runs eight parallel instances, here in counter mode. Not surprisingly, this is faster but requires a parallel block cipher mode. Analogously, the Khazad implementation runs 16 parallel instances.
This work builds upon two recent results on AES software implementations that remarkably manage to achieve constant-time and exceptional performance at one stroke.
-A common hardware technique to compute the AES S-box uses an isomorphism IF 2 8 → IF 2 2 4 and subsequently reduces the problem of inversion in the latter field to that of one in in the ground field; [13, 14, 7] are good examples of this. Using a similar technique in software when equipped with a byte-vector shuffle instruction and using a novel field element representation, Hamburg presents techniques for fast and constant-time software implementation of AES [10] . Running only a single instance of the cipher, the implementation is compatible with all standard block cipher modes.
-Käsper and Schwabe present AES bit-slice techniques, aligning individual bits of state bytes in distinct registers [11] . The implementation runs eight parallel streams in counter mode under the same key. Not only does this provide a constant-time implementation, but also is currently the fastest published AES counter mode implementation in software (not considering newer Intel models equipped with AES instruction set extensions). Table- based AES implementations on common platforms that can perform only
